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  Historical	   sociology	   (HS)	   is	   well	   positioned	   to	   analyze	   the	   impact	   of	   the	   Arab	  Uprising	   on	   Middle	   East	   states;	   indeed,	   Ibn	   Khaldoun,	   one	   of	   its	   precursors,	  pioneered	  our	  understanding	  of	  MENA	  state	  formation.	  In	  the	  positivist	  tradition	  of	  material/structural	  analysis,	   it	  has	  several	  advantages	  over	   its	  main	  rival	   for	  understanding	  the	  Uprising,	  democratization	  theory	  (DT).	  	  First,	   it	  posits	   the	  co-­‐constitution	  of	  the	  inter/trans-­‐national	  and	  the	  state	  
levels.	   Thus,	   it	   traces	   the	   impact	   of	   long-­‐term	  macro	   transformations	   on	   state	  formation,	   as	   in	   Barrington	   Moore’s	   (1966)	   analysis	   of	   how	   agricultural	  modernization	  shaped	  dictatorship	  and	  democracy	  and	  Tilly’s	  (1990)	  account	  of	  how	   war-­‐making	   drove	   state	   formation	   in	   the	   West;	   in	   parallel,	   its	   Weberian	  strain	   (e.g.	   Mann	   1984)	   focuses	   on	   shorter-­‐term	   internal	   state	   building	  processes,	   such	   as	   the	   cycle	   between	   charismatic	   and	   patrimonial	   leadership,	  and	  the	  interaction	  of	  political	  participation	  and	  institutionalization	  (Huntington	  1968).	  	   Second,	   HS	   eschews	   teleological	   assumptions	   of	   a	   universal	   democratic	  end	   point	   of	   development.	   For,	   if	   modernization	   theory	   identified	   a	   law	   of	  increasing	   politicization	   driven	   by	   socio-­‐economic	   modernization,	   classical	  political	   sociology’s	   “Iron	   Law	   of	   Oligarchy”	   (Michels	   1966),	   exposed	   the	  practices	   used	   to	   sustain	   elite	   or	   class	   rule	   in	   spite	   of	   this	   (and	   regardless	   of	  competitive	  elections):	  elites’	  disproportionate	  resources	  (information,	  wealth),	  command	  of	   the	   levers	  of	  bureaucracies	  and	  relative	  cohesion	  compared	  to	  the	  divided,	   usually	   inactive	   and	   inattentive	   public.	   Similarly,	   while	   revolutionary	  periods	   feature	   exceptional	   mass	   activism,	   such	   mobilization	   cannot	   be	  sustained,	   especially	   if	   revolutions	   are	   merely	   political	   turnovers,	   leaving	   the	  distribution	  of	  property	  intact.	  Thus,	  rather	  than	  linear	  “progress”	  toward	  mass	  empowerment,	   HS	   expects	   an	   on-­‐going	   struggle	   of	   oligarchic	   and	   democratic	  tendencies.	  	  	   	  Third,	   instead	   of	   DT’s	   one-­‐dimensional	   dichotomization	   of	   states	   into	  simple	   authoritarian	   and	   democratic	   opposites,	   HS	   expects	   actually	   existing	  regime	  types	  to	  be	  variegated	  along	  two	  separate	  dimensions,	  elite	  contestation	  and	  mass	   inclusion,	  which	  may	  not	   vary	   together:	   thus,	   high	   elite	   contestation	  and	   low	   mass	   inclusion	   was	   typical	   of	   landed	   oligarchy	   while	   under	   populist	  republics	   a	   contraction	   of	   contestation	   was	   enabled	   by	   an	   expansion	   of	   mass	  inclusion,	  only	  to	  be	  later	  followed	  in	  “post-­‐populist”	  republics	  by	  a	  contraction	  of	  inclusion	  (Hinnebusch	  2010).	  Moreover,	  continuums	  better	  capture	  the	  actual	  political	   world	   than	   dichotomies,	   with	   hybrid	   regimes	   common	   in	   which	   elite	  dominance	   is	  qualified	  by	  episodes	  of	  elite	  contestation	  and	  mass	  mobilization.	  This	  is	  likely	  to	  be	  the	  outcome	  of	  the	  Arab	  Uprising.	  	  	   Fourth,	   for	   HS,	   states’	   tangents	   are	   understood,	   not	   according	   to	   what	  abstract	  or	  normative	  theories	  expect,	  but	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  path	  dependency—how	  the	  past	  shapes	  the	  future,	  with	  the	  inertia	  of	  “successful”	  institutional	  solutions	  closing	   off	   some	   possibilities,	   making	   other	   more	   likely	   (Mahoney	   2000).	   Yet,	  since	  the	  past	  is	  the	  outcome	  of	  contingent	  agency,	  state	  formation	  tangents	  are	  
historically	  specific,	  varying	  by	  region	  and	  between	  early	  and	  late	  developers.	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Illustrating	  HS	  in	  Action:	  	  
	   The	   utility	   of	   HS	   can	   be	   illustrated	   by	   a	   brief	   sketch	   of	   how	   an	  understanding	   of	   the	   evolution	   of	   the	   MENA	   states	   system,	   co-­‐constituted	   by	  external	  and	   internal	   forces,	  along	  path	  dependent	   tangents,	   contextualizes	   the	  Arab	   Uprising.	   The	   states	   system	   created	   under	  Western	   imperialism	   suffered	  from	   built-­‐in	   flaws,	   notably	   lack	   of	   congruence	   between	   sub	   and	   supra-­‐state	  identities	   and	   newly	   created	   states	   with	   often-­‐artificial	   boundaries,	   hence	  pervaded	   with	   irredentism.	   The	   region’s	   subsequent	   development	   reflected	  attempts	   by	   state	   builders	   to	   find	   solutions	   to	   these	   flaws.	   State	   builders	  interacted	  with	  macro-­‐level	   trends	  such	  as	  de-­‐colonization	  and	  globalization	  to	  produce	   variegated	   hybrids	   of	   patrimonial	   and	   institutional	   authority.	   The	  agency	   of	   earlier	   phases	   created	   durable	   but	   suboptimal	   structural	   outcomes	  whose	   costs	   stimulated	   further	   agency,	   and	   so	   on,	   with	   the	   Arab	   Uprising	   a	  symptom	  of	  the	  ultimate	  failure	  to	  create	  strong	  states.	  	  
	   Several	  distinct	  phases	  in	  MENA	  state	  formation	  can	  be	  identified.	  The	  Age	  
of	  Liberal	  Oligarchy	   (1920-­‐70)	  was	  dominated	  by	  oligarchic	  regimes	  still	  under	  British	   hegemony	   and	   economically	   dependent.	   With	   formally	   liberal	   elite	  contestation	   but	   little	   mass	   inclusion,	   they	   faced	   revolt	   from	   the	   emerging	  middle	   class	   and	   peasantry.	   The	   Age	   of	   Pan-­‐Arab	   Revolution	   (1950-­‐70)	   was	   a	  reaction	   to	   oligarchy	   and	   imperialism	   enabled	   by	   global	   decolonization.	   Pan-­‐Arab	  movements	  unleashed	  praetorian	  instability	  (army	  coups,	  student	  revolts)	  but	   in	  Egypt	  Nasser	   forged	  the	  prototype	  of	   the	  populist	  authoritarian	  republic	  that	   narrowed	   elite	   contestation	   while	   expanding	   mass	   inclusion	   through	  redistributive	   social	   policies	   and	   national	   economic	   development.	   Nasser	  exploited	  Soviet	  protection	  and	  Pan-­‐Arabism	  to	  roll	  back	  British	  hegemony	  in	  the	  name	  of	  an	  autonomous	  Arab	  region	  but	  his	  defeat	  in	  the	  1967	  Arab-­‐Israeli	  war	  marked	   the	   failure	   of	   this	   project.	   In	   the	   Age	   of	   Realism	   (1970-­‐90)	   a	   relative	  consolidation	   of	   the	   state	   resulted	   from	   state	   builders’	   efforts	   to	   counter	  praetorianism,	   war	   preparation	   and	   the	   expansion	   of	   oil	   rent.	   	   Republics	   and	  monarchies	   converged	   through	   similar	   neo-­‐patrimonial	   practices	   combining	  elite	   assabiyya,	   modern	   bureaucracy	   and	   clientalism.	   Wars	   generated	   security	  dilemmas,	   provoking	   realist	   power	   balancing	   via	   arms	   races	   and	   alliance	  formation.	  The	  Age	  of	  Post-­‐Populist	  Dependency	  (1990-­‐2010)	  was	  a	  consequence	  of	  the	  global	  triumph	  of	  neo-­‐liberal	  capitalism	  over	  socialism,	  combined	  with	  the	  overdevelopment/over-­‐militarization	   of	   regional	   states	   relative	   to	   their	  economic	   bases,	   exposed	   with	   the	   oil	   price	   bust,	   resulting	   in	   debt,	   economic	  crisis,	   economic	   liberalization	   and	   openings	   to	   the	   West.	   The	   consequent	  favouring	  of	  crony	  capitalists	  and	  foreign	  investors	  and	  exclusion	  of	  the	  masses,	  ushered	   in	   “post	  populist	   authoritarianism,”	  with	  political	   Islam	  mobilizing	   the	  marginalized.	   	  The	  outcomes	  of	  the	  Arab	  Uprising	  are	  path	  dependent	  products	  of	  this	  heritage.	  	  HS	   also	   allows	  us	   to	  better	  understand	   the	  Arab	  Uprising.	  At	   the	  macro	  level,	   the	   Uprising	   was	   a	   function	   of	   how	   neo-­‐liberal	   globalization	   had	   both	  driven	   post-­‐populist	   mass	   exclusion	   and	   also	   promoted	   democracy	   discourse	  and	  Internet	  technology	  that	  encouraged	  anti-­‐regime	  mobilization.	  The	  Uprising	  unleashed	  both	  elite	   contestation	  and	  mass	  political	  mobilization,	   in	  which	   the	  overthrow	   of	   authoritarian	   presidents,	   weakening	   of	   state	   establishments	   and	  initial	   empowerment	   of	   Islamist	   outsiders	   appeared	   to	   reverse	   inherited	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hierarchies.	   	   However,	   revived	   oligarchic	   tendencies	   soon	   undermined	   mass	  empowerment.	   International	   finance	   capital,	   locking	   governments	   into	   neo-­‐liberal	  practices,	  excluded	  the	  big	  issue	  of	  revolutionary	  politics—redistribution	  of	   wealth-­‐-­‐from	   political	   agendas.	   With	   post-­‐Uprising	   elites,	   regardless	   of	  ideological	   orientation,	   constrained	  by	   economic	  dependency,	   elections	  offered	  limited	  policy	  choices,	  hence	  political	  competition	  has	  been	  diverted	  into	  cultural	  
wars	  that	  sharply	  divided	  the	  masses.	  	  	   Indeed,	  mass	  mobilization	  unleashed	   trans-­‐state	  wars	   over	   identity,	   but	  rather	   than	   the	   inclusive,	   egalitarian	   Pan-­‐Arab	   identity	   Nasser	   had	   promoted,	  highly	  divisive	  Sunni	  vs.	  Shia,	  secular	  vs.	  Islamist	  discourses	  dominated.	  The	  Gulf	  monarchies,	   local	  manifestations	   of	   global	   finance	   capital,	  were	   empowered	   as	  Uprisings	   opened	   the	   republics	   to	   penetration	   by	   their	   petrodollars,	   arms	   and	  salafi	   ideologies,	  while	   the	   republics,	   especially	  multi-­‐sectarian	   Syria,	   Iraq	   and	  Lebanon,	  were	  destabilized.	  	   Finally,	  the	  Uprising	  unleashed	  a	  new	  deeper	  wave	  of	  “praetorianism”	  as	  political	  mobilization	   exceeded	   institutionalization	   and	   politics	   was	   played	   via	  street	   protests	   and	   military	   intervention,	   as	   well	   as	   elections,	   without	   agreed	  rules	  of	   the	   game	   (Huntington	  1968).	  The	  masses	  were	  now	  a	  key	   resource	   in	  intra-­‐elite	  power	  struggles	  between	  state	  establishments,	  liberal	  secularists	  and	  Islamists.	   Where	   the	   central	   power	   survived,	   hybrid	   regimes	   combined	  authoritarian	   exclusion	   with	   elections	   in	   which	   rivals	   used	   identity	   politics	   to	  mobilize	  constituencies;	  where	  it	  collapsed,	  mass	  praetorianism	  took	  the	  form	  of	  armed	  social	  movements	  and	  warlords,	  as	  in	  Libya	  and	  Syria.	  	  	   In	   summary,	   variegated	   regimes	   mixing	   oligarchic	   and	   democratic	  tendencies	   are	   being	   co-­‐constituted	   by	   international	   and	   internal	   forces,	   along	  paths	  dependent	  on	  the	  region’s	  historical	  inheritance.	  	  	  
Conclusion:	  HS,	  possibly	  handicapped	  by	   its	   relative	  prioritization	  of	   structure	  over	  agency	  and	  ideas,	  did	  not,	  of	  course,	  anticipate	  the	  occasion	  of	  the	  Uprising,	  specifically	  the	  ability	  of	   internet-­‐armed	  youth	   to	  destabilize	  durable	   regimes.	  Yet,	   as	  path	  dependency	   tells	   us,	   the	   Uprising	   was	   not	   only	   a	   reaction	   against	   what	   came	  before,	   but	   is	   also	   constrained	   by	   this	   prior	   inheritance;	   thus,	   the	   incongruity	  between	   the	   idea	   of	   democracy	   and	   durable	   oligarchic	   material	   structures—military	   institutions,	   international	   finance	   capital—resulted	   in	   consequences	  quite	   unintended	   by	   revolutionary	   agents,	  much	   as	   the	   “iron	   law	   of	   oligarchy”	  suggests.	   Several	   other	  HS-­‐inspired	   analyses	  have	   reached	   similar	   conclusions:	  Zubaida	   (2011)	   saw	   the	   Uprising	   reproducing	   MENA’s	   historical	   cycles	   of	  political	   activism	   and	   patrimonialism	   while	   Lawson	   (2012)	   identified	   global	  structural	   constraints	  on	   revolutionary	  agency.	   	  Because	   the	  Arab	  Uprising	  has	  not	  re-­‐written	  the	  basic	  rules	  of	  political	  life,	  “old”	  HS	  tools	  of	  analysis	  remain	  as	  relevant	  as	  ever.	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